

P802.11wTM/D2.03

Draft ~~Amendment to~~ Standard for Information Technology - Telecommunications and ~~Information Exchange Between Systems~~ information exchange between systems - ~~LAN/MAN Specific Requirements~~ Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements -

Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications:

Amendment ~~<number>~~5 : Protected Management Frames

EDITORIAL NOTE - In this redline version of the draft, inserted text is shown as Inserted Text and deleted text is shown as Deleted Text.

EDITORIAL NOTE - Editorial notes are distinguished like this. They are not part of the amendment and will be removed before it is published.:

EDITORIAL NOTE - the amendment number will be inserted by IEEE-SA editorial staff during preparation for publication.

EDITORIAL NOTE- This revision of the amendment is based on the following (baseline) documents:

- 802.11-2007
- 802.11k ~~D7~~D8.0
- 802.11r ~~D4~~D7.10
- 802.11n D2.007
- 802.11y ~~D1~~D4.10

The editing instructions contained in this amendment define how to merge the material contained herein into the existing base standard and its amendments to form the comprehensive standard.

The editing instructions are shown in ***bold italic***. Four editing instructions are used: ***change***, ***delete***, ***insert***, and ***replace***. ***Change*** is used to make corrections in existing text or tables. The editing instruction specifies the location of the change and describes what is being changed by using ~~strike through~~ (to remove old material) and underscore (to add new material). ***Delete*** removes existing material. ***Insert*** adds new material without disturbing the existing material. Insertions may require renumbering. If so, renumbering instructions are given in the editing instructions. ***Replace*** is used to make changes in figures or equations by removing the existing figure or equation and replacing it with a new one. Editorial notes will not be carried over into future editions because the changes will be incorporated into the base standard.

EDITORIAL NOTE - The following table is not part of the amendment, and will be removed before the document is finalized.

Table 0—Change history

Draft version	Date	Contributions and motions applied
1.01	Jan. 17, 2007	Apply all editorial comment resolutions per 11-06-1729r11.
1.02	Mar. 8, 2007	Apply passed motions per 11-06-1759r4 and 11-07-100r3.
1.03	Mar 9, 2007	Include submissions 11-07-218r0, 11-07-2115,9r0, 11-07-221r0, 11-07-220r0, 11-07-243r3,11-07-390r0, 11-07-393r0 comments from group 8, 10 thru 18. Rev draft to 1.03
2.0	Mar 20, 2007	Renumber to Draft 2.0
2.1	July 3, 2007	Incorporate updates per May 2007 (Montreal) meeting to resolve comments: 212, 282, 68,569,213,80,214,285,103,104, 646, 244, 215,289, 711,17,37,246,291,581,647,38,648,218,430,293,582,649,715,717,294, 297,651,299,720,721,300,90,302,723,728,309,470,309,729,448,49,752,731,732,315,733,437,303,107,367,652,157,440,653,108,304,442,450,111, 320,657,326,659,280
2.2	August 13, 2007	Incorporate editorial changes based on 11-07-714r10 and submissions 11-07-2051r2, 11-07-2241r0 (2nd page only), 11-07-243r7, 11-07-2239r0, 11-07-2244r3, 11-07-2240r1, 11-07-2238r1
2.3	Sept. 7, 2007	Incorporate further updates per 11-07/714r11 Group 7 and Group 8

2. References

3. Definitions

Change-Insert the following ~~definition in alphabetical order~~ definitions:

3.72a Integrity GTK (IGTK): A random value, assigned by the broadcast/multicast source, which is used to protect broadcast/multicast medium access control (MAC) management protocol data units (MMP-DUs) from that source.

3.125a Robust Management ~~Frame~~frame: A management frame that is eligible for protection by the Robust Management ~~Frame service (See 5.4.3.7)~~frame service.

4. Abbreviations and acronyms

Insert the following new abbreviations and acronyms in alphabetical order:

BIP Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol

IGTK Integrity GTK

IPN IGTK packet number

MMIE Management MIC Information Element

5. General ~~Description~~description

~~5.1 General description of the architecture~~

5.2 Components of the IEEE 802.11 ~~architecture~~11architecture

~~5.2.1 The independent BSS (IBSS) as an ad-hoc network~~

~~5.2.2 STA membership in a BSS is dynamic~~

5.2.3 Distribution system (DS) concepts

~~5.2.3.1 Extended service set (ESS): The large coverage network~~

5.2.3.2 RSNA

Insert at the end of the ~~hashed~~~~dashed~~ item list in 5.2.3.2:

- Enhanced cryptographic encapsulation mechanisms for Robust Management frames

~~5.3 Logical service interfaces~~

5.4 Overview of the services

~~5.4.1 Distribution of messages within a DS~~

~~5.4.2 Services that support the distribution service~~

5.4.2.4 Disassociation

Change the 3rd paragraph of 5.4.2.4 as follows:

The disassociation service may be invoked by either party to an association (non-AP STA or AP). Disassociation is a notification, not a request. Disassociation cannot be refused by either party to the association, except when ~~Robust Management frame protection~~Frame Protection is enabled and the disassociation message integrity check fails.

5.4.3 Access control and data confidentiality services

~~5.4.3.1 Authentication~~

5.4.3.2 Deauthentication

Change the 2nd paragraph of 5.4.3.2 as follows:

In an ESS, because authentication is a prerequisite for association, the act of deauthentication ~~causes~~ shall ~~cause~~ the station to be disassociated. The deauthentication service may be invoked by either authenticated party (non-AP STA or AP). Deauthentication is not a request; it is a notification. Deauthentication ~~is~~ shall not be refused by either ~~party except in the case when management frame protection is enabled. In the latter case, deauthentication will not occur if the message integrity check fails~~ party. ~~When an AP sends a deauthentication notice to an associated STA, the association shall also be terminated. When an associated STA sends a deauthentication notice to an associated STA, the association shall also be terminated~~ When an AP sends a deauthentication notice to an associated STA, the association shall also be terminated. When an associated STA sends a deauthentication notice to an associated STA, the association shall also be terminated ~~message integrity check fails.~~

Change the 4th paragraph of 5.4.3.2 as follows:

In an RSNA, deauthentication also destroys any related PTKSA, group temporal key security association (GTKSA), station to station link master key security association (SMKSA), ~~and~~ station to station link transient key security association (STKSA), and integrity group temporal key security association (IGTKSA) that exist in the STA and closes the associated IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port. If pairwise master key (PMK) caching is not enabled, deauthentication also destroys the pairwise master key security association (PMKSA) from which the deleted PTKSA was derived.

~~*EDITORIAL NOTE: The 11w-1.0 draft paragraphs did not match the 802.11ma-D9.0 paragraph, so it has been adapted to match as close as feasible.*~~

5.4.3.3 Data ~~Confidentiality~~ confidentiality

Change the text of 5.4.3.3 as follows:

In a wired LAN, only those STAs physically connected to the wire can send or receive LAN traffic. With a wireless shared medium, there is no physical connection, and all STAs and certain other RF devices in or near the LAN may be able to send, receive, and/or interfere with the LAN traffic. Any IEEE 802.11-compliant STA can receive all like-PHY IEEE 802.11 traffic that is within range and can transmit to any other IEEE 802.11 STA within range. Thus, the connection of a single wireless link (without data confidentiality) to an existing wired LAN may seriously degrade the security level of the wired LAN.

To bring the security of the WLAN up to the level implicit in wired LAN design, IEEE Std 802.11 provides the ability to protect the contents of messages. This functionality is provided by the data confidentiality service. Data confidentiality is an SS.

IEEE Std 802.11 provides three cryptographic algorithms to protect data traffic: WEP, TKIP, and CCMP. WEP and TKIP are based on the ARC4¹⁴ algorithm, and CCMP is based on the advanced encryption standard (AES). A means is provided for STAs to select the algorithm(s) to be used for a given association.

IEEE 802.11 provides one cryptographic algorithm, CCMP, to protect unicast Robust Management frames.

The default data confidentiality state for all IEEE 802.11 STAs is “in the clear”. If the data confidentiality service is not invoked, all ~~messages~~ frames shall be sent unprotected. If this policy is unacceptable to the sender, it shall not send data frames; and if the policy is unacceptable to the receiver, it shall discard any received data frames. Unprotected ~~data~~ frames received at a STA configured for mandatory data confidentiality, as well as protected ~~data~~ frames using a key not available at the receiving STA, are discarded without an indication to LLC (or without indication to distribution services in the case of “To DS” frames received at

an AP). These frames are acknowledged on the WM [if received without frame check sequence (FCS) error] to avoid wasting WM bandwidth on retries of frames that are being discarded.

5.4.3.4 Key management

Change the text of 5.4.3.4 as follows:

The enhanced data confidentiality, data authentication, and replay protection mechanisms require fresh cryptographic keys and corresponding security associations. The procedures defined in this standard provide fresh keys by means of protocols called the 4-Way Handshake and Group Key Handshake.

5.4.3.5 Data origin authenticity

Change the text of 5.4.3.5 as follows:

The data origin authenticity mechanism defines a means by which a STA that receives a data ~~or robust management~~ Robust Management frame can determine which STA transmitted the MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) ~~or MAC management protocol data unit (MMPDU)~~. This feature is required in an RSNA to prevent one STA from masquerading as a different STA. ~~This mechanism is provided for STAs that use CCMP or TKIP.~~

Data origin authenticity is only applicable to unicast data frames, ~~or and unicast Robust Management frames, and Deauthenticate or Disassociate frames with Robust Management protection~~. The protocols do not guarantee data origin authenticity for broadcast/multicast data frames ~~or broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames~~, as this cannot be accomplished using symmetric keys and public key methods are too computationally expensive.

5.4.3.6 Replay ~~Detection~~ detection

Change the text of 5.4.3.6 as follows:

The replay detection mechanism defines a means by which a STA that receives a data ~~or Robust Management~~ Frame frame from another STA can detect whether the ~~received data~~ frame is an unauthorized retransmission. This replay protection mechanism is provided for data frames for STAs that use CCMP or TKIP. The replay protection mechanism is also provided for ~~robust management~~ Robust Management frames for STAs that use CCMP and BIP.

Insert ~~a new subclause 5.4.3.7~~ the following sub clause after 5.4.3.6 as follows:

5.4.3.6a Robust Management frame protection

~~Management frame protection is required in an RSNA to protect against forgery and eavesdropping on robust unicast management frames, and against forgery on robust broadcast/multicast management frames.~~

~~Management frame protection extends the CCMP data frame protection to provide data confidentiality, replay protection, and data origin authenticity for robust unicast management frames.~~ The Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames are Action frames, Disassociate and Deauthenticate frames.

~~Forgery protection for robust broadcast/multicast management frames is provided through the Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol (BIP), using AES-128-CMAC for message integrity. The BIP protocol also provides replay protection.~~

~~*EDITORIAL NOTE: The editor was further removed references to insider attack in the above paragraph, though this was missed in the adopted submission 11-06-1932r0. Since the removal of DHV, there is no longer the means to mitigate insider attacks.*~~

Management ~~frame protection~~ Frame Protection protocols apply to Robust Management frames after the RSNA PTK key establishment for protection of unicast frames is completed and after delivery of the GTKs IGTKs to protect broadcast/multicast ~~frames that have been delivered~~ frames. ~~All management frames sent or received by a STA before keys are installed shall be unprotected.~~

~~5.5 Multiple logical address spaces~~

~~5.6 Differences between ESS and IBSS LANs~~

~~5.7 Reference Model~~

5.8 IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X

~~5.8.1 IEEE 802.11 usage of IEEE 802.1X~~

5.8.2 Infrastructure functional model overview

5.8.2.1 AKM operations with AS

Change the second paragraph of 5.8.2.1 as follows:‡


A 4-way Handshake utilizing EAPOL-Key frames is initiated by the Authenticator to do the following:

- Confirm that a live peer holds the PMK.
- Confirm that the PMK is current.
- Derive a fresh pairwise transient key (PTK) from the PMK.
- Install the pairwise encryption and integrity keys into IEEE 802.11.
- Transport the group temporal key (GTK) and GTK sequence number from Authenticator to Supplicant and install the GTK and GTK sequence number in the STA and, if not already installed, in the AP.
- If Robust ~~management frames~~ Management Frame Protection is enabled, transport the integrity GTK (IGTK), and the IGTK sequence number from Authenticator to the Supplicant and install these values in the STA and, ~~in~~ if not already installed, in the AP.
- Validate/Verify that the RSN ~~capabilities~~ capabilities negotiated are valid as defined in 7.3.2.25.3.
- Confirm the cipher suite selection.

Insert the following paragraph at the end of 5.8.2.1:

When Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~ Protection is enabled, the Authenticator also uses the Group Key Handshake with all associated STAs to change the IGTK. The Authenticator encrypts the GTK, and IGTK values in the EAPOL-Key frame as described in 8.5.

Replace Figure 5-13 with the following figure, with the changes being the inclusion of “IGTK” in message 3 and in both the Supplicant and Authenticator boxes that begin with “Install” and in the Authenticator box to “Generate GTK and IGTK”:






Figure 5-13—Establishing pairwise and group keys

Replace Figure 5-14 with the following figure, with the changes being the inclusion of “Encrypted IGTK” in Message 1, “IGTK” in the Authenticator box beginning with “Generate” and “IGTK” in the Supplicant box beginning with “Install”; the update to the 2nd box on the right has *intentionally* fixed ~~from the 802.11ma D9.0 draft 11-2007~~ to correctly state “Encrypt GTK, IGTK with KEK”:





Figure 5-14 — Delivery of subsequent group keys

5.8.2.2 Operations with PSK

Change-Insert a new item after the 3rd item in 5.8.2.2 as follows:

- ~~The GTK and GTK sequence number~~If Robust Management Frame Protection is enabled, ~~IGTK, the IGTK and their IGTK sequence number, GTK~~ sequence number are sent from the Authenticator to the Supplicant just as in the AS case. See ~~Figure 13~~Figure 5-13— and ~~Figure 14~~Figure 5-14 —.

5.8.3 ~~IBSS functional model description~~

5.8.4 ~~Authenticator to AS protocol~~

5.8.5 ~~PMKSA caching~~

Insert a new ~~subclause 5.8.6~~ sub clause after 5.8.5 as follows:

5.8.5a Protection of ~~robust~~ broadcast and multicast ~~management Action~~Robust Management frames

~~When Robust Management frame support has been enabled, all Robust broadcast/multicast management frames are submitted for encapsulation to the broadcast/multicast frame protection service as described in 11.7. This service shall protect the frame using BIP.~~

When Management Frame Protection is enabled, all broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames shall be encapsulated using the procedures defined in 11. This service provides integrity protection of broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames using BIP.

6. MAC service definition

6.1 Overview of MAC services

6.1.1 Data service

6.1.2 Security services

Change the text of 6.1.2 as follows:

Security services in IEEE Std 802.11 are provided by the authentication service and the TKIP₁ and ~~CCM-
P~~and CCMP and BIP mechanisms. The scope of the security services provided is limited to station-to-station data and ~~robust management~~Robust Management frame exchanges~~transmissions-exchange~~. The data confidentiality service offered by an IEEE 802.11 TKIP and CCMP implementation is the protection of the MSDU. ~~When CCMP is used, the data confidentiality service is also provided for the MPDU or unicast MMPDU.~~ For the purposes of this standard, TKIP and CCMP are viewed as logical services located within the MAC sublayer as shown in the reference model, Figure 5-10 (in 5.7). Actual implementations of the TKIP and CCMP services are transparent to the LLC and other layers above the MAC sublayer.

The security services provided by ~~TKIP₂~~TKIP and CCMP in IEEE Std 802.11 are as follows:

- a) Data Confidentiality;
- b) Authentication; and
- c) Access control in conjunction with layer management~~s~~.

BIP provides authentication (integrity) and access control for ~~robust~~-broadcast/multicast ~~management~~
Robust Management frames.

During the authentication exchange, both parties exchange authentication information as described in Clause 8 and ~~8A11A~~.

The MAC sublayer security services provided by TKIP₁ and CCMP and BIP rely on information from non-layer-2 management or system entities. Management entities communicate information to ~~TKIP-TKIP₁ and CCMP, and CCMP-BIP~~ through a set of MAC sublayer management entity (MLME) interfaces and MIB ~~attributes~~attributes; in particular, the decision tree for TKIP₁ and CCMP and BIP defined in 8.7 is driven by MIB attributes.

The use of WEP for confidentiality, authentication, or access control is deprecated. The WEP algorithm is unsuitable for the purposes of this standard.

The standard does not support the use of TKIP for Management Frame Protection.

7. Frame formats

7.1 MAC Frame formats

7.1.3 Frame fields

7.1.3.1 Frame control field

7.1.3.1.8 Protected frame field

Change the text of 7.1.3.1.8 as follows:

The Protected Frame field is 1 bit in length. The Protected Frame field is set to 1 if the Frame Body field contains information that has been processed by a cryptographic encapsulation algorithm. The Protected Frame field is set to 1 only within data frames, ~~and~~ within management frames of subtype Authentication and within unicast Robust ~~management~~ Management frames. The Protected Frame field is set to 0 in all other frames. When the Protected Frame field is set to 1, the Frame Body field is protected utilizing the cryptographic encapsulation algorithm and expanded as defined in Clause 8. The Protected Frame field is set to 0 in Data frames of subtype Null Function, CF-ACK (no data), CF-Poll (no data), and CF-ACK+CF-Poll (no data) (see 8.3.2.2 and 8.3.3.1 that show that the frame body must be one octet or longer to apply the encapsulation).

7.2 Format of individual frame types

7.2.3 Management frames

7.2.3.3 Disassociation frame format

Change 7.2.3.3 including Table 7-9 (with the changes of Table 7-9 being the addition of the Management MIC IE) and a note at the end of the table as follows:

The frame body of a management frame of subtype Disassociation contains the information shown in Table 7-9.

Table 7-9—Disassociation frame body

Order	Information
1	Reason Code
2-(Last -1)	One or more vendor-specific information elements may appear in this frame.
Last	Management MIC IE (MMIE)

NOTE: The Management MIC IE appears after any fields that it protects. Therefore, it should always appear last in the frame to protect contents of the entire frame.

7.2.3.11 Deauthentication

Change 7.2.3.11 including Table 7-18 (with the changes of Table 7-18 being the addition of the Management MIC IE as the “Last” value in the “Order” column and removing the 2nd sentence in the “Information” column of the new Order “2”) row and a note at the end of the table as follows:

The frame body of a management frame of subtype Deauthentication contains the information shown in Table 7-18.

Table 7-18—Deauthentication frame body

Order	Information
1	Reason Code
2-(Last -1)	One or more vendor-specific information elements may appear in this frame. This information element follows all other information elements.
Last	Management MIC IE (MMIE)

NOTE: The Management MIC IE appears after any fields that it protects. Therefore, it should always appear last in the frame to protect contents of the entire frame.

7.2.3.12 Action frame format

Change 7.2.3.12 including Table 7-19 (with the changes of Table 7-19 being the addition of the Management MIC IE as the new order “Last”, and removing the 2nd sentence of the resulting “Information” column in the new Order “2” row) and a note at the end of the table as follows:

The frame body of a management frame of subtype Deauthentication contains the information shown in Table 7-19.

Table 7-19—Action frame body

Order	Information
1	Action
2-(Last -1)	One or more vendor-specific information elements may appear in this frame. This information element follows all other information elements.
Last	Management MIC IE (MMIE)

NOTE: The Management MIC IE appears after any fields that it protects. Therefore, it should always appear last in the frame to protect contents of the entire frame.

7.3 Management frame body components

7.3.1 Fixed fields

~~7.3.1.1 Authentication algorithm number field~~

~~7.3.1.2 Authentication transaction sequence number field~~

~~7.3.1.3 Beacon interval field~~

~~7.3.1.4 Capability information field~~

~~7.3.1.5 Current AP address field~~

7.3.1.7 Listen interval Reason code field

~~7.3.1.8 Reason code field~~

Insert the following rows into Table 22 - Reason Codes before the “Reserved” entry and update the numbering appropriately:

Table 7-22—Reason Codes

Reason Code	Meaning
TBD <ANA>	Invalid management group cipher
TBD <ANA>	Robust management frame policy violation

EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry values are left as ~~TBD~~<ANA> for now, pending ANA assignment

7.3.2 Information Elements

~~7.3.2.25 RSN information element~~

Change the last paragraph in 7.3.2 as follows:

A STA that encounters an unknown or reserved element ID value in a management frame received without error shall ignore that element and shall parse any remaining management frame body for additional information elements with recognizable element ID values. The frame body components specified for many management subtypes result in elements ordered by ascending element ID, with the exception of the MIC Management IE (7.3.2.54). The MIC Management IE must appear at the end of any Robust Management frame to protect the entire contents of the frame.

Insert the following ~~XXX rows~~ row (ignoring the header row) in Table 26 - Element IDs in the correct position to preserve ordering by the “Element ID” column and update the “Reserved” range of codes appropriately:

Table 7-26—Element IDs

Information Element	Element ID	Length (in octets)
Management MIC (see 7.3.2.51—7.3.2.54 (MMIE))	TBD <ANA>	16 18

~~*EDITORIAL NOTE-NOTE: TBD<ANA> request to ANA for assignment of MMIE.*~~

7.3.2.25 RSN information element

Change the first paragraph of 7.3.2.25 as follows:

The RSN information element contains authentication and pairwise cipher suite selectors, a single group data cipher suite selector, ~~and an~~ RSN Capabilities field, the PMK identifier (PMKID) count, and PMKID list. ~~If dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled is set to TRUE, a single management group cipher suite selector is appended to the information element optionally included.~~ See Figure 89. All STAs implementing RSNA shall support this element. The size of the RSN ~~infomration~~ information element is limited by the size of an information element, which is 255 octets. Therefore, the number of pairwise cipher ~~suited~~ suites, AKM suites, and PMKIDs is limited.

~~*Insert the following paragraph after the first paragraph of 7.3.2.25 as follows:*~~

~~All STAs implementing RSNA shall support this element. Further, if dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled is TRUE, then the Robust Management frame protection bit in the RSN capabilities field shall be set to 1 and the Management Group Cipher Suite must be present in this information element.~~

*Replace Figure 89-7-72 with the following figure, where a new field **Group Management Group Cipher** is inserted at the end and “Data” ~~in serted~~ inserted in the 4th column to read “Group Data Cipher Suite”:*

Element ID	Length	Version	Data Group Data Cipher Suite	Pair-wise Cipher Suite Count	Pair-wise Cipher Suite List	AKM Suite Count	AKM Suite List	RSN Capabilities	PMKID Count	PMKID List	Group Management Group Cipher Suite
1	1	2	4	2	4*m	2	4*n	2	2	16*s	4

Figure 7-72—RSN Information Element format

~~*Change the following text before last paragraph of 7.3.2.25.125 as follows:*~~

NOTE- The following represent sample information elements:

802.1X authentication, CCMP and data group cipher suites (WEP-40, WEP-104, and TKIP not allowed):

30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value

14, // length in octets, 20 expressed as Hex value
01 00, // Version 1
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as data group key cipher suite
01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as pairwise cipher suite
01 00, // authentication count
00 0F AC 01 // IEEE 802.1X authentication
00 00 // No capabilities

~~IEEE 802.1X authentication, CCMP pairwise and group key-cipher suites (neither WEP-40, WEP-104, nor 104 and TKIP are not allowed), Robust Management Frame protection allowed and enforced with AES-128-CMAC as the broadcast/multicast management suite selector, preauthentication supported:~~

30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
14, // length in octets, 20 expressed as Hex value
01 00, // Version 1
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as data group key cipher suite
01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as pairwise cipher suite
01 00, // authentication count
00 0F AC 01 // IEEE 802.1X authentication
01 00 // Preauthentication capabilities

802.1X authentication, Use GTK for pairwise cipher suite, WEP-40 group cipher suites, optional RSN Capabilities omitted:

30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
12, // length in octets, 18expressed as Hex value
01 00, // Version 1
00 0F AC 01, // WEP-40 as data group key cipher suite
01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
00 0F AC 00, // Use group key as pairwise cipher suite
01 00, // authentication count
00 0F AC 01 // IEEE 802.1X authentication

802.1X authentication, Use CCMP for pairwise cipher suite, CCMP group cipher suites, preauthentication and a PMKID:

30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
~~14~~26, // length in octets, ~~20 expressed~~ 38expressed as Hex value
01 00, // Version 1
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as ~~the data~~ group ~~key~~ cipher suite
01 00, // pairwise ~~key~~ cipher suite count
00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as pairwise ~~key~~ cipher suite
01 00, // authentication count
00 0F AC 01 // IEEE 802.1X authentication

01 00 // Preauthentication capabilities
 01 00 // PMKID Count
 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 // PMKID

Insert the following text before 7.3.2.25.1:

IEEE 802.1X authentication, CCMP pairwise and group key cipher suites (WEP-40, WEP-104, and TKIP are not allowed), and Robust Management Frame Protection are allowed and enforced with AES-128-CMAC as the broadcast/multicast management suite selector.

30, // information element id, 48 expressed as Hex value
 1A, // length in octets, 26expressed as Hex value
 01 00, // Version 1
 00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as the data group key cipher suite
 01 00, // pairwise key cipher suite count
 00 0F AC 04, // CCMP as pairwise cipher suite
 01 00, // authentication count
 00 0F AC 01 // IEEE 802.1X authentication
~~03 40 80 00~~ // Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~-Protection is ~~enabled and enforced~~en-abled
 00 00 // No PMKIDs
 00 0F AC ~~06~~<ANA>, // AES-128-CMAC as the broadcast/multicast management cipher suite

EDITORIAL NOTE : <ANA> request to ANA for assignment of AES-128-CMAC.

7.3.2.25.1 Cipher suites

Change the 1st paragraph of 7.3.2.25.1 as follows:

The Data Group ~~Data~~ Cipher Suite field contains the cipher suite selector used by the BSS to protect broadcast/multicast ~~data~~ ~~traffic~~ ~~frames~~ ~~traffic~~.

Change-Insert a new paragraph after the 3rd paragraph of 7.3.2.25.1 as follows:

The ~~Pairwise Cipher Suite List~~ field ~~contains a series of cipher suite selectors that indicate the pairwise cipher suites contained in the RSN information element.~~ ~~The~~ Management Group Cipher Suite field contains the cipher suite selector used by the BSS to protect broadcast/multicast management ~~traffic~~ ~~frames~~.

Change Table 32 as follows:

Table 7-32—Cipher suite selectors

OUI	Suite Type	Meaning
00-0F-AC	0	Use group cipher suite
00-0F-AC	1	WEP-40
00-0F-AC	2	TKIP

Table 7-32—Cipher suite selectors

OUI	Suite Type	Meaning
00-0F-AC	3	Reserved
00-0F-AC	4	CCMP - default <u>pairwise cipher suite</u> in an RSNA
00-0F-AC	5	WEP-104
<u>00-0F-AC</u>	TBD <ANA>	<u>AES-128-CMAC - default management group cipher suite in a BIP enabled RSNA</u>
00-0F-AC	?-255	Reserved
Vendor OUI	Other	Vendor specific
Other	any	Reserved

EDITORIAL NOTE: Last assigned value is 5; should request ANA for value 6, but leave as ~~TBD~~<ANA> as noted above.

Insert the following paragraph after the third paragraph of 7.3.2.25.1:

When Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection is enabled, the negotiated pairwise cipher suite is used to protect ~~the~~unicast Robust Management ~~Frames~~frames and the management group cipher suite is used to protect ~~the~~broadcast/multicast Robust Management ~~Frames~~frames. Use of AES-128-CMAC is only valid as a management group cipher suite. ~~CCMP is the only valid pairwise cipher suite used to protect unicast Robust Management Frames.~~

Replace Table 33 with the following Table:

7.3.2.25.2 AKM suites

Table 33—Cipher suite usage

Cipher Suite Selector			Enabled Robust Management Frame Protection	
	GTK	PTK	Unicast Robust Management Frames	Broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames
Use group key	No	Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
WEP-40	Yes	No	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
WEP-104	Yes	No	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
TKIP	Yes	Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
CCMP	Yes	Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>AES-128-CMAC</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>

Change Table 33 by adding two new columns “Unicast Robust Management frames and “Broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames” under a general column heading “Enabled Robust Management Frame Protection” on the right and appending a new row for AES-128-CMAC with the new cell values as follows:

Table 7-33—Cipher suite usage

Cipher Suite Selector	GTK	PTK	<u>Management Frame Protection enabled</u>	
			<u>Unicast Robust Management frames</u>	<u>Broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames</u>
Use group key	No	Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
WEP-40	Yes	No	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
WEP-104	Yes	No	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
TKIP	Yes	Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>
CCMP	Yes	Yes	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>AES-128-CMAC</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>

7.3.2.25.3 RSN capabilities

Replace-Change Figure 91-7-74 with the following (change being the addition of bit 6 as AES-128-CMAC[#7], ~~bit 7 as Robust Management Frame protection-Protection~~ and changing “Reserved” to be 87):

B0	B1	B2 – B3	B4 – B5	<u>B6</u>	<u>B7</u>	<u>B8</u>	B9	B10-15
Pre-Auth	No Pair-wise	PTKSA Replay Counter	GTKSA Replay Counter	<u>AES-128-CMAC</u>	<u>Robust Management Frame protection</u>	<u>Reserved</u>	PeerKey Enabled	Reserved

B0	B1	B2 – B3	B4 – B5	<u>B6</u>	<u>B7</u>	<u>B8</u>	B9	B10	B11	B12-15
Pre-Auth	No Pair-wise	PTKSA Replay Counter	GTKSA Replay Counter	<u>Reser-ved</u>	<u>Robust Management Frame Protection</u>	<u>Reser-ved</u>	Peer-Key Enabled	SPP A-MSDU Capable	SPP A-MSDU Required	Reser-ved

Figure 7-74 — RSN Capabilities field format

EDITORIAL NOTE: TGr has already made the assignment of bit 6 for AES-128-CMAC which needs to be approved by IEEE 802.11 ANA. This update requests TGw usurp bit 7 for Robust Management Frame protection pending ANA assignment.

EDITORIAL NOTE: This update requests TGw use bit 7 for Robust Management Frame Protection pending ANA assignment. This is realizing TGr (as of Draft 7.0) no longer uses bit 6 and but is currently assigned to TGr per ANA. Consider the above TBD pending ANA assignment.

Insert after DashList item “Bits ~~6~~4-5”:

- Bit 6: Reserved.*
- Bit 7: Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection. A STA sets this bit to 1 to enable protection of Robust Management Frames. If an AP ~~has set the dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames,~~ sets dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed to then that AP allows RSNA connections from non-AP STAs which do not provide Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection.*

Change DashList item “Bits ~~7~~6-8 and 10-15” as follows:

- Bits ~~7~~6-8 and ~~10~~12-15: Reserved. The remaining subfields of the RSN Capabilities field are reserved and shall be set to 0 on transmission and ignored on reception.*

7.3.2.46 Fast BSS transition information element

EDITORIAL NOTE: This clause is introduced by TGr and is tracked by TGw.

Insert the following row (ignoring the header row) in Table 7-43d - “Sub-element IDs” before the “Reserved” entry and renumbering the “Reserved” values as appropriate:

Table 7-43m—Sub-element IDs

Value	Contents of data field	Length (in octets)
4	IGTK	24

Insert the following paragraph and Figure 7-95aj after the paragraph ending with the sentence “ It is encoded following the conventions from 7.1.1” in 7.3.2.46:

IGTK contains the Integrity GTK, used for Robust Management frames. It is encoded in the same way as the GTK, as specified above. The IGTK sub-element format is shown in Figure 7-95aj.

	Sub-element ID	Length	KeyID	PN	Key	ICV (see 11A.8.5)
Octets	1	1	2	6	16	8

Figure 7-95aj—IGTK sub-element format

EDITORIAL NOTE: 802.11-2007 ends with 7.3.2.35, TGk adds it thru 41, TGr adds it through 48, TGn succeeds it through 5253, TGw follows with 5354

Insert at the end of ~~subclause-sub clause~~ 7.3.2.52-53 the new ~~subclause-sub clause~~ 7.3.2.53-54 as follows:

7.3.2.54 Management MIC information element

The Management MIC information element (MMIE) provides message integrity and protects ~~robust~~ broadcast/multicast ~~management~~ Robust Management frames from forgery and replay. ~~It also provides message integrity for broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames.~~ Figure 7-95ak ~~Figure 112wa~~ shows the MMIE format.

	Element ID	Length	Key ID	Replay Sequence number	MIC
Octets	1	1	2	6	8

Figure 7-95ak —Management MIC information element format

EDITORIAL NOTE: The figure is numbered 112wa as TGn follows its own convention, 112 is the last figure in TGMa D9.0 and TGr also has inserted figures after 112.

The value of the Element ID field is TBD.

~~{EDITORIAL NOTE : TBD request to ANA for assignment}.~~

The Length field denotes the number of octets in the information element and has a value of 16.

The Key ID field identifies the ~~broadcast/multicast key~~ IGTK used to compute the MIC. Bits 0-11 defines a value in the range 0-4095. Bits 12 - 15 are reserved and set to 0 on transmission and ignored on reception. ~~By convention, the~~ The IGTK Key ID ~~shall be~~ is either 4 or 5. The remaining Key IDs are reserved for future multicast extensions.

The ~~Replay~~Sequence Number field ~~value is~~ contains a 6 ~~octets~~octet value, interpreted as a 48-bit unsigned integer and used ~~as a sequence number~~ to prevent replay of broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames.

The MIC field contains a message integrity code calculated over the Robust Management ~~Frame~~frame as specified in 8.3.4.5 and 8.3.4.6.

8. Security

8.1 Framework

8.1.1 Security methods

Insert the following sub-item ~~at the end of~~ between “CCMP and RSNA” in 8.1.1:

- BIP, described in 8.3.4

8.1.2 RSNA equipment and RSNA capabilities

8.1.3 RSNA establishment

Insert sub-item ‘7’ in the first item (‘a’) as follows:

- 7) If Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection is enabled, it programs the TK and pairwise cipher suite into the MAC for protection of robust unicast management frames. It also installs the IGTK, and IGTK sequence counter.

Insert sub-item ‘6’ in the second item (‘b’) as follows:

- 6) If Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection is enabled, it ~~protects the Robust Management Frames by programming programs~~ the negotiated pairwise cipher suite and established PTK, IGTK, and IGTK sequence counter.

~~8.2 Pre-RSNA security methods~~

Change the title of -8.3 as follows:

8.3 RSNA ~~data confidentiality and integrity~~ protocols

8.3.1 Overview

Change the 1st paragraph of -8.3.1 as follows:

This standard defines two RSNA confidentiality and integrity protocols: TKIP and CCMP. This standard defines one integrity protocol: BIP.

Implementation of CCMP shall be mandatory in all IEEE 802.11 devices claiming RSNA compliance.

~~This standard defines two RSNA data confidentiality and integrity protocols: TKIP, and CCMP. This standard defines one integrity protocol: BIP. Implementation of CCMP shall be mandatory in all IEEE 802.11 devices claiming RSNA compliance. Implementation of TKIP is optional for an RSNA and used only for the protection of data frames. A design aim for TKIP was that the algorithm should be implementable within the capabilities of most devices supporting only WEP, so that many such devices would be field-upgradeable by the supplier to support TKIP. BIP is a mechanism used only when protection of Robust Management Frames is enabled and is used to provide integrity protection for Robust broadcast/multicast management frames.~~

8.3.2 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

BIP is a mechanism used only when protection of Robust Management frames is enabled and is used to provide integrity protection for broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames.

EDITORIAL NOTE : The updates to the above paragraph does not show the added paragraph breaks with underline/strikethrough.

8.3.3 CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP)

8.3.3.1 CCMP Overview

Insert the following paragraph at the end of -8.3.3.1:

When CCMP is selected as the RSN pairwise cipher and ~~dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled~~ Management Frame Protection is **TRUE** enabled, unicast Robust ~~unicast management~~ Management frames shall be protected with CCMP. ~~A MAC implementation shall support CCMP for protecting management frames if CCMP and Robust Management Frame protection are both supported.~~

8.3.3.3 CCMP cryptographic encapsulation

8.3.3.3.1 PN processing

8.3.3.3.2 Construct AAD

Change Figure 135 with the following underlined updates as follows:

EDITORIAL NOTE: 8.3.3.3.2 is updated per TGn changes as well.

Replace Figure 8-17 with the following figure removing the muted bit descriptions and including the underlined updates:

	FC (bits 4,5,6 = 0 in data MPDUs only) (bits 7,11,12,13 = 0) (bit 13 = 0 in data MPDU only) (bits 14=1)	A1 or MMPDU DA	A2 or MMPDU SA	A3 or MMPDU BSSID	SC (bits 4-15=0)	A4	QC
Octets	2	6	6	6	2	6	2

	FC (bits 4,5,6,11,12,13, 15=0) (bit 14=1)	A1	A2	A3	SC (bits 4-15=0)	A4	QC (bits 4-6, 8-15=0) (bit 7: see NOTE)
Octets	2	6	6	6	2	6	2

Figure 8-17—AAD construction

Change the third paragraph of 8.3.3.3.2 as follows:

The AAD is constructed from the MPDU Header. The AAD does not include the header Duration field, because the Duration field value can change due to normal IEEE 802.11 operation (e.g. a rate change during retransmission). The AAD does not include the Duration/ID field or the HT Control field, because the contents of these fields can change during normal operation (e.g., due to a rate change preceding re-transmission). The HT Control field can also be inserted or removed during normal operation (e.g., retransmission of an A-MPDU, where the original A-MPDU included an MCS request that has already generated a response). For similar reasons, several sub-fields in the Frame Control field are masked to 0. AAD construction is performed as follows:

- a) FC - MPDU Frame Control field, with:
 - 1) Subtype bits (bits 4 5 6) in a Data MPDU masked to 0;
 - 2) Retry bit (bit 11) masked to 0
 - 3) ~~Retry~~PwrMgt bit (bit ~~11~~12) masked to 0;
 - 4) ~~PwrMgt~~MoreData bit (bit ~~12~~13) masked to 0;
 - 5) ~~MoreData~~Protected Frame bit (bit ~~13~~14) masked-always set to 0;1
 - 6) ~~The Protected Frame~~Order bit (bit ~~14~~15) always set masked to 1;0
- b) A1 - MPDU Address 1 field
- c) A2 - MPDU Address 2 field
- d) A3 - MPDU Address 3 field
- e) SC - MPDU Sequence Control field, with the Sequence Number subfield (bits 4-15 of the Sequence Control field) masked to 0. The Fragment Number subfield is not modified.
- f) A4 - MPDU Address field, if present in the Data MPDU.
- g) ~~QC—QoS Control field, if present, a 2-octet field that includes the MDSU priority. The QC TID is used in the construction of the AAD, and the remaining QC fields are set to 0 for the AAD calculation (bits 4 to 15 are set to 0).~~

EDITORIAL NOTE: The SC field should be considered in an MMPDU as well so no modifications are made in there per CID, the A4 and Qos do not readily apply to management frames (yet).

- h) QC - QoS Control field, if present, a 2-octet field that includes the MSDU priority. The QC TID field is used in the construction of the AAD. When both the STA and its peer have their SPP A-MSDU Capable fields set to 1, bit 7 (the A-MSDU Present field) is used in the construction of the AAD. The remaining QC fields are set to 0 for the AAD calculation (bits 4 to 6, bits 8 to 15, and bit 7 when either the STA or its peer has the SPP A-MSDU Capable field set to 0).

8.3.3.3.3 Construct CCM nonce

Replace Figure 136-8-18 with the following figure "replacing "Priority Octet" with "Nonce Flag Octet", and addition of "Management" as bit 4 of this octet.":




Figure 8-18 — Nonce Construction

EDITORIAL NOTE: ANA must be requested for this bit (4). There has have been issues editing the above Figure and thus is left as B4....readers should note that until ANA assigns this bit, it should read TBD<ANA>, pending ANA assignment.

Change the second paragraph 8.3.3.3.3 as follows:

The Nonce field has an internal structure of the ~~Priority Nonce Flags Octet~~ || A2 || PN ("||" is concatenation), where

- The ~~Priority Octet~~ field shall be set to the fixed value 0 (0x00) when there is no QC field present in the MPDU header. When the QC field is present, bits 0 to 3 of the ~~priority Octet~~ field shall be set to the value of the QC TID (bits 0 to 3 of the QC field). Bits 4 to 7 of the ~~Priority Octet~~ field are reserved and shall be set to 0.

- The Priority sub-field of the Nonce Flags field shall be set to the fixed value 0 when there is no QC field present in the MPDU header. When the QC field is present, bits 0 to 3 of the Priority field shall be set to the value of the QC TID (bits 0 to 3 of the QC field).
- The Management field of the Nonce Flags field shall be set to 1 if the Type field of the Frame Control field is 00 (Management frame); otherwise, if the Type field otherwise it is not 00, then the Management field of the Nonce flags octet shall be set to 0.
- Bits 5 to 7 of the Nonce Flags field are reserved and shall be set to 0 on transmission and ignored on reception transmission.
- MPDU Address A2 field occupies octets 1-6. This shall be encoded with the octets ordered with A2 octet 0 at octet index 1 and A2 octet 5 at octet index 6. If the frame is of type Management Frame and Management Frame protection is enabled, the MMPDU SA shall be encoded with the octets ordered with the MMPDU SA octet 0 at octet index 1 and MMPDU SA octet 5 at octet index 6.
- The PN field occupies octets 7-12. The octets of PN shall be ordered so that PN0 is at octet index 12 and PN5 is at octet index 7.

8.3.3.3.4 Construct CCMP Header

8.3.3.3.5 CCM originator processing

Insert the following text at the end of 8.3.3.3.5:

A CCMP protected ~~robust~~ unicast ~~management~~ Robust Management frame shall be protected with the TK.

8.3.3.4 CCMP decapsulation

Change item 'c' as follows:

- c) The Nonce value is constructed from the A2, PN, and ~~Priority Nonce Flags~~ fields.

Insert the following paragraph ~~at the end of~~ before 8.3.3.4.1:

When the received frame is a CCMP protected robust unicast management frame, contents of the MMPDU body after protection is removed shall be delivered to the SME via the MLME primitive designated for that management frame rather than through the MA-UNITDATA.indication primitive.

8.3.3.4.1 CCM recipient processing

Insert the following sentence at the end of the first paragraph in 8.3.3.4.1:

A CCMP protected ~~robust~~ unicast ~~management~~ Robust Management frame shall use the same TK as a Data ~~MPDU or MMPDU~~ MPDU.

8.3.3.4.2 Decrypted CCMP MPDU

8.3.3.4.3 PN and replay detection

Change item 'e' as follows:

- e) For each PTKSA, GTKSA, and STKSA, the recipient shall maintain a separate replay counter for each IEEE 802.11 MSDU or A-MSDU priority and shall use the PN recovered from a received frame to detect replayed frames, subject to the limitation of the number of supported replay counters indicated in the RSN Capabilities field (see 7.3.2.25-). A replayed frame occurs when the PN extracted from a received frame is less ~~that~~ than or equal to the current replay counter value for the frame's MSDU priority and frame type. A transmitter shall not use IEEE 802.11 MSDU or A-

MSDU priorities without ensuring that the receiver supports the required number of replay counters. The transmitter shall not reorder frames within a replay counter, but may reorder frames across replay counters. One possible reason for reordering frames is the IEEE 802.11 MSDU or A-MSDU priority.

For each IGTKSA the recipient shall maintain a single frame replay counter for broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames frames, and shall use the PN recovered from received broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames to detect replayed frames as described above for data frames

Insert the following bullet after ‘e’ :

- e1) If ~~dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnables~~ dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled is TRUE, the recipient shall maintain a single management frame replay counter and shall use the PN from a received management frame to detect replayed management frames. ~~-A~~ replayed frame occurs when the PN from a received management frame is less than or equal to the current management frame replay counter value. A replayed frame shall be silently discarded and the ~~dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays~~ dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays shall be incremented by 1. The transmitter shall preserve the order of Robust Management Frames-frames sent to the same DA.

Insert a new subclause the following after 8.3.4 at the end of 8.3.3 as follows:

8.3.4 The Broadcast/Multicast integrity protocol

~~Broadease~~Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol (BIP) provides data integrity and replay protection for ~~Robust~~ broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames after successful completion of either a 4-way ~~Handshake~~Handshake or FT 4-way handshake, and delivery of the IGTK.

8.3.4.1 BIP overview

BIP provides data integrity and replay protection, using AES-128 in CMAC Mode. NIST SP 800-38B defines the CMAC algorithm. All BIP processing uses AES with a 128-bit integrity key and a 128-bit block size, and a CMAC TLen value of 64 (8 octets).

BIP uses the Integrity GTK (IGTK) to compute the broadcast/multicast MMPDU MIC. The authenticator shall distribute one new IGTK and IGTK PN whenever it distributes a new GTK. The IGTK is identified by the MAC address of the ~~STA~~ transmitting ~~#STA~~, plus ~~a non-zero 12-bit key~~ an IGTK identifier that is encoded in the MMIE Key ID field.

8.3.4.2 BIP MMPDU format

The Management MIC IE shall follow all of the other IEs in the management frame body but precede the FCS. See ~~7.3.2.51~~7.3.2.54 for the format of the Management MIC IE. Figure ~~137wa~~8-19a shows the BIP MMPDU.






Figure 8-19a — BIP Encapsulation

8.3.4.3 BIP AAD Construction

The BIP ~~AA~~ Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) shall be constructed from the ~~MMPDU~~ MPDU header. The Duration field in the AAD shall be masked to 0. The AAD construction shall use a copy of the IEEE 802.11 header ~~without the SC field~~ for the ~~MMPDU~~ MPDU, with the following exceptions:

- a) FC - ~~MMPDU~~ MPDU Frame Control field, with:
 - 1) Retry bit (bit 11) masked to zero;
 - 2) PwrMgt bit (bit 12) masked to zero;
 - 3) MoreData bit (bit 13) masked to zero;
- ~~b) A1 - MMPDU DA~~
- ~~c) A2 - MMPDU SA~~
- ~~d) A3 - MMPDU BSSID~~
- ~~e) SC - MMPDU Sequence Control field, with the sequence number field (bits 4-15 of the Sequence Control field) masked to zero. The Fragment number bits are not modified.~~
- f) A1 - MPDU Address 1 field;
- g) A2 - MPDU Address 2 field;
- h) A3 - MPDU Address 3 field.

Figure ~~137wb~~ 8-19b depicts the format of the AAD. The length of the AAD is ~~22~~ 20 octets.



~~Figure 137wb — wAAD Construction~~




Figure 8-19b — AAD Construction

8.3.4.4 BIP replay protection

The MMIE Replay field represents a sequence number whose length is 6 octets.

The transmitter shall insert a monotonically increasing value into the MMIE Replay field. The receiver shall maintain a 48-bit replay counter for each IGTK. The replay ~~counter, counter shall be set to the value of the IPN in the IGTK KDE provided by the Authenticator~~ ~~shall be set to the value provided by the Authenticator~~. The receiver shall interpret the MMIE Replay field as a ~~48~~ 48-bit integer. It shall then compare this integer value against the replay counter for the IGTK identified by the MMIE Key ID field. If the integer value from the received MMIE Replay Field is less than or equal to the replay counter value for the IGTK, the receiver shall silently discard the frame and increment the ~~dot11RSNAStatsBIPReplays counter~~ ~~dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays counter~~ by 1.

Note - when the IGTK PN space is exhausted, the choices available to an implementation are to replace the IGTK or to end communications.

8.3.4.5 BIP transmission

When a STA transmits a protected ~~robust~~-broadcast/multicast ~~management~~-Robust Management frame it shall:

- a) Select the appropriate key (IGTK) for the frame and construct the MMIE (see ~~7.3.2.26~~7.3.2.54) with the MIC field masked to zero and the KeyID field set to ~~zero~~the corresponding IGTK KeyID value. ~~Transmitter~~The transmitter shall select a valid transmit sequence number as given in ~~clause 8.3.4.4.1~~8.3.4.4 and insert this value into the MMIE Replay Counter field.
- b) Compute AAD as specified in ~~8.3.4.3~~8.3.4.3.
- c) Compute AES-128-CMAC ~~with a Tlen of 64~~, over the concatenation of (AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE), and insert the ~~64~~64-bit output into the MMIE MIC field.
- d) Compose the broadcast/multicast Robust Management ~~Frame~~-frame as the IEEE 802.11 header, ~~management frame body~~, ~~Management Frame Body~~MMIE, and ~~MMIE~~FCS.
- e) Transmit the ~~robust~~-broadcast/multicast ~~management~~-Robust Management frame.

8.3.4.6 BIP reception

When a STA receives a ~~robust~~-broadcast/multicast ~~management~~-Robust Management frame ~~protected~~-protected by BIP, it shall:

- a) Identify the appropriate IGTK key and associated state based on the MMIE ~~Length~~-KeyID field.
- ~~b) Execute the appropriate replay protection scheme defined in 8.3.4.4.~~
- c) Perform replay protection as defined in 8.3.4.4. If the replay protection fails, the `dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays` shall be incremented by 1 and the frame shall be discarded. If the replay protection succeeds, the receiver shall compute AAD for this management frame, as specified in 8.3.4.3.
- d) ~~If the replay protection scheme succeeds, the~~The receiver shall ~~compute AAD for this management frame~~extract and save the received MIC value, ~~as specified in 8.3.4.3~~and compute the AES-128-CMAC over the concatenation of ~~-(AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE)~~ with the MIC field masked to zero in the MMIE). If the ~~replay protection fails~~result does not match the received MIC value, then the ~~dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays~~receiver shall ~~be incremented~~discard the frame and increment the ~~frame shall be discarded~~`dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors` counter by 1.

~~If the result does not match the value in the MMIE, then the receiver shall silently discard the frame and increment the dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors counter. If Robust Management Frame Protection is enabled, broadcast management broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames that are received without BIP protection shall be silently discarded..~~

8.4 RSNA security association management

8.4.1 Security associations

8.4.1.1 Security association definitions

~~Change the last sentence of the second paragraph as follows:~~

~~There are four six types of security associations supported by an RSN STA:~~

A security association is a set of policy(ies) and key(s) used to protect information. The information in the security association is stored by each party of the security association, must be consistent among all parties, and must have an identity. The identity is a compact name of the key and other bits of security association information to fit into a table index or an MPDU. ~~There are four types of security associations supported by an RSN STA.~~ The following types of security associations are supported by an RSN STA:

Insert the following item after the ~~this hashed~~ third dashed item (i.e.g. after GTKSA) in the list:

- IGTKSA: A result of a successful Group Key Handshake, successful 4-way Handshake, or the (Re)association Response message of the Fast BSS Transition protocol.

~~8.4.1.1.1 PMKSA~~

~~8.4.1.1.2 PTKSA~~

~~8.4.1.1.3 GTKSA~~

Insert the following as a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause succeeding 8.4.1.1.3:

8.4.1.1.3a IGTKSA

~~A Supplicant~~ When Management Frame Protection is enabled, a Non-AP STA's SME creates an IGTKSA when it receives Message 3 of the 4-Way Handshake, the (Re)association Response message of the Fast BSS Transition protocol, or Message 1 of the Group Key Handshake. ~~When Robust Management Frame is enabled, the~~ The IGTKSA is unidirectional and is created by the 4-way Handshake, Fast BSS Transition protocol handshake, or the Group Key Handshake. The Authenticator's SME creates an IGTKSA when it changes the IGTK with all STAs to which it has a valid PTKSA.

An IGTKSA consists of the following elements:

- Direction vector (whether the IGTK is used for transmit or receive)
- KeyID
- ~~— For the Authenticator, the IGTK~~
- IGTK
- Authenticator MAC address.

8.4.1.2 Security association life cycle

8.4.1.2.1 Security association in an ESS

Change item 'd' as follows:

- e) The last step is key management. The authentication process creates cryptographic keys shared between the IEEE 802.1X AS and the STA. The AS transfers these keys to the AP, and the AP and STA use one key confirmation handshake, called the 4-Way Handshake, to complete security association establishment. The key confirmation handshake indicates when the link has been secured by the keys and is ready to allow normal data traffic and ~~protect~~ Robust Management ~~Frames~~frames.

Change the last sentence of the last paragraph as follows:

A STA's SME uses this primitive when it deletes a PTKSA, ~~or~~ GTKSA or IGTKSA.

8.4.2 RSNA selection

8.4.3 RSNA policy selection in an ESS

Insert the following text before 8.4.3.1:

An RSNA-capable AP may choose to ~~accept, as set in the policy variable dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames,~~ associate with RSNA STAs with or without the capability for ~~management frame protection~~ Management Frame Protection set in the RSN information element, as set in the ~~RSN IE~~ policy variable dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed. A STA may choose not to associate with an AP that does not advertise protection of Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames in the RSN capabilities. ~~In the case where~~ When an RSNA STA tries to associate without ~~Robust~~ Management Frame ~~protection~~ Management Frame Protection, the AP may reject the (Re)association if ~~dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames~~ dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed is set to false. A non-AP STA may use dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed to decide whether to associate with an AP that does advertise Management Frame Protection. Table ~~59a~~ 8-1a details all the possibilities.

AP's State	Non-AP STA's State	AP Action	STA/Supplicant Action
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 1	if STA's RSN IE advertises a different Management Group Ciphersuite then AP shall reject (re)association request with Reason Code TBD else AP may accept (re)association request. The AP shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management Frames protected by the data pairwise ciphersuite, and broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames protected by the Management Group Ciphersuite.	if AP's RSN IE advertises a different Management Group Ciphersuite then STA shall not (re)associate with this AP else STA may (re)associate with this AP. The STA shall transmit unicast Robust Management Frames protected by the data pairwise ciphersuite, and broadcast/multicast Robust Management protected by the Management Group Ciphersuite.

dot11RSNAProtectionManagement-FramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagement-Frames = true	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	AP may (re)associate with this STA. The AP shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management Frames unprotected; the AP shall protect broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames using the Management Group Ciphersuite.	The STA ignores all Robust Management Frame protection.
dot11RSNAProtectionManagement-FramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagement-Frames = false	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	AP shall reject any (Re)associate Request from this STA with reason code TBD	The STA may reassociate with this AP.
RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	dot11RSNAProtectionManagement-FramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagement-Frames = true	The AP ignores all Robust Management Frame protection	The STA may reassociate with this AP. The STA shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management Frames unprotected.
RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	dot11RSNAProtectionManagement-FramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagement-Frames = false	The AP ignores all Robust Management Frame protection	The STA shall not (Re)associate with this AP

Table 8-1a—Robust Management frame selection in an ESS

AP's State	Non-AP STA's State	AP Action	STA/Supplicant Action
<p>dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE</p>	<p>RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub-field = 1</p>	<p>if STA's RSN IE advertises a different Management Group Cipher suite then AP shall reject (re)association request with Reason Code "Invalid management group cipher" else AP may accept (re)association request. The AP shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management frames protected by the data pairwise cipher suite, and broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames protected by the Management Group Cipher suite.</p>	<p>if AP's RSN IE advertises a different Management Group Cipher suite then STA shall not (re)associate with this AP else STA may (re)associate with this AP. The STA shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management frames protected by the data pairwise cipher suite, and receive broadcast/multicast Robust Management protected by the Management Group Cipher suite.</p>
<p>dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = TRUE</p>	<p>RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub-field = 0</p>	<p>AP may (re)associate with this STA. The AP shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management frames to and from this STA unprotected; the AP shall protect broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames using the Management Group Cipher suite.</p>	<p>The STA may associate with this AP with no Robust Management frame Protection.</p>

Table 8-1a—Robust Management frame selection in an ESS

AP's State	Non-AP STA's State	AP Action	STA/Supplicant Action
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = FALSE	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub-field = 0	AP shall reject any (Re)associate Request from this STA with reason code "Invalid management group cipher"	The STA may try to reassociate with this AP.
RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub-field = 0	dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = TRUE	The AP may associate with this STA with no Robust Management frame protection	The STA may reassociate with this AP. The STA shall transmit and receive unicast and broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames unprotected.
RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub-field = 0	dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = false	The AP transmits management frames unprotected and will silently discard any protected management frames it receives	The STA shall not (Re)associate with this AP

8.4.4 ~~Robust Management Frame~~RSNA policy selection in an ESSIBSS

8.4.5 ~~RSNA~~ policy selection in an IBSS

8.4.5.1 ~~TSN~~ policy selection in an IBSS

Insert a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause 8.4.4.2 as follows:

8.4.5.2 Robust Management ~~Frame~~frame policy selection in an IBSS

~~Robust~~Management Frame ~~protection~~Protection is valid only if RSNA is selected to protect data messages and dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled is set to TRUE.

In an IBSS two 4-Way Handshakes exchange RSN information elements to establish the security of the link between two STAs. The ~~Robust~~Management Frame Protection capabilities are determined by the RSN information elements exchanged in the 4-Way Handshake initiated by the Authenticator of the STA with the larger MAC address. Table 8-1b ~~Table 59b~~ details all of the possibilities, including the case when the STA with the larger MAC address does not support Management Frame protection.

Local STA's State	Peer STA's State	Local STA's Action
-------------------	------------------	--------------------

<p>dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true</p>	<p>RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 1</p>	<p>if Peer STA's RSN IE advertises a different Management Group Ciphersuite then The Local STA shall abort 4-Way Handshakes with the Peer STA else 4-Way Handshakes with the Peer STA may complete successfully. The Local STA shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management Frames protected by the data pairwise ciphersuite, and broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames protected by the Management Group Ciphersuite.</p>
<p>dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames = true</p>	<p>RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0</p>	<p>The Local STA may complete 4-Way Handshake with the Peer STA. The Local STA shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management Frames unprotected; the Local STA shall transmit broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames protected using the Management Group Ciphersuite, but receive broadcast/multicast Robust Management Frames from the Peer STA unprotected.</p>

dot11RSNAProte- ctedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames = false	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection sub- field = 0	The Local STA shall abort any 4-Way Handshakes with this Peer STA
--	--	---

~~Table 59b — Robust Mangement Frame Selection in an IBSS~~

~~8.4.6 RSN management of the IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port~~

~~8.4.6 RSNA authentication in an ESS~~

~~8.4.7 RSNA authentication in an IBSS~~

~~8.4.8 RSNA key management in an ESS~~

Table 8-1b—Robust Management frame selection in an IBSS

STA's State	Peer STA's message contents	Local STA's Action
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 1	if Peer STA's message contents has an RSN IE that advertises a mismatching Management Group Cipher suite then The STA's state shall abort 4-Way Handshakes with the Peer STA else 4-Way Handshakes with the Peer STA may complete successfully. The STA's state shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management frames protected by the data pairwise cipher suite, and broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames protected by the Management Group Cipher suite.

Table 8-1b—Robust Management frame selection in an IBSS

STA's State	Peer STA's message contents	Local STA's Action
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = true	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	The STA's state may complete 4-Way Handshake with the Peer STA. The STA's state shall transmit and receive unicast Robust Management frames unprotected; the STA's state shall transmit broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames protected using the Management Group Cipher suite, but receive broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames from the Peer STA's message contents unprotected.
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = true AND dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = false	RSN IE Robust Mgmt Frame protection subfield = 0	The STA's state shall abort any 4-Way Handshakes with this Peer STA's message contents
dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesEnabled = false or not implemented	Any	The STA shall transmit Robust Management frames without protection, shall discard any unicast protected Robust Management frames it receives, and shall ignore the MMIE in any broadcast/multicast protected Robust Management frame it receives.

8.4.9 RSNA key management in an IBSS

Change the text of 8.4.9 as follows:

To establish a security association between two STAs in an IBSS, each STA's SME must have an accompanying IEEE 802.1X Authenticator and Supplicant. Each STA's SME initiates the 4-Way Handshake from the Authenticator to the peer STA's Supplicant (see 8.4.7). Two separate 4-Way Handshakes are conducted.

The 4-Way Handshake is used to negotiate the pairwise cipher suites, as described in 8.4.4. The IEEE 802.11 SME configures the temporal key portion of the PTK into the IEEE 802.11 MAC. Each Authenticator uses the KCK and KEK portions of the PTK negotiated by the exchange it initiates to distribute its own GTK and if Robust Management Frame protection is enabled, its own IGTK. Each Authenticator generates its own GTK and if Robust Management Frame protection is enabled, its own IGTK, and uses either the 4-Way Handshake or the Group Key Handshake to transfer the GTK and if Robust Management Frames protection is enabled, the IGTK, to other STAs with whom it has completed a 4-Way Handshake. The pairwise key used between any two STAs shall be the pairwise key from the 4-Way Handshake initiated by the STA with the highest MAC address.

A STA joining an IBSS is required to adopt the security configuration of the IBSS, which includes the group cipher suite, pairwise cipher suite, ~~and AKMP~~, and if Robust Management Frame protection is enabled, Management Group Cipher Suite (see 8.4.4). The STA shall not set up a security association with any STA having a different security configuration. The Beacon and Probe Response frames of the various STAs within an IBSS must reflect a consistent security policy, as the beacon initiation rotates among the STAs.

A STA joining an IBSS shall support and advertise, in the Beacon frame, the security configuration of the IBSS, which includes the group cipher suite, advertised pairwise cipher suite, ~~and AKMP~~, and if Robust Management Frame protection is enabled, Management Group Cipher Suite (see 8.4.4). The STA may use the Probe Request frame to discover the security policy of a STA, including additional unicast cipher suites the STA supports. A STA shall ignore Beacon frames that advertise a different security policy.

8.4.10 RSNA security association termination

Change first paragraph as follows:

When a non-AP STA SME receives a successful MLME Association or Reassociation confirm primitive that is not part of a Fast BSS Transition or receives or invokes an MLME Disassociation or Deauthentication primitive, it will delete some security associations. Similarly, when an AP SME receives an MLME Association or Reassociation indication primitive that is not part of a Fast BSS Transition, or receives or invokes an MLME Disassociation or Deauthentication primitive, it will delete some security associations. In the case of an ESS the non-AP STA's SME shall delete the PTKSA, GTKSA, ~~IGTKSA~~, SMKSA, and any STKSA, and the AP's SME shall delete the PTKSA, and invoke an STSL application teardown procedure for any of its STKSAs. An example of an STSL application teardown procedure is described in 11.7.3. In the case of an IBSS, the STA's SME shall delete the PTKSA and the receive GTKSA and IGTKSA. Once the security associations have been deleted, the SME then invokes MLME-DELETEKEYS.request primitive to delete all temporal keys associated with the deleted security associations. The IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port returns to being blocked. As a result, all data frames are unauthorized before invocation of an MLME-DELETEKEYS.request primitive.

EDITORIAL NOTE: TGr has also updated this paragraph, do we reconcile it here or let 802.11ma do the update?

Insert ~~a new subclause~~ sub-clauses 8.4.11 and 8.4.12 as follows:

8.4.11 Protection of unicast/broadcast/multicast management frames

~~When Robust Management Frame protection is enabled and the 4-Way Handshake is completed, all transmissions of Robust management Action frames shall be protected. Unicast Action frames shall have integrity and confidentiality protection using pairwise keys. Multicast and broadcast Action, disassociate and deauthenticate frames (sent by the AP) shall be integrity protected only using BIP.~~

When Management Frame Protection is enabled and the 4-Way Handshake is completed successfully, all transmissions of Robust Management frames shall be protected. When Management Frame Protection is enabled on the receiver and advertised by the transmitter, all received broadcast/multicast Robust Management frames shall be discarded if a matching IGTK is not available or if the frame is unprotected.

NOTE- BIP does not provide protection against forgery by associated and authenticated non-AP STAs.

Protection of broadcast/multicast management Action frames shall be provided by a service in the MLME as described in -11.7.

~~Insert a new subclause 8.4.12 as follows:~~

8.4.12 Robust Management ~~Frame~~ **frame** Selection Procedure

If the AKM suite selected in the RSN IE is ~~Suite Type 00-0F-AC:1~~ or ~~00-0F-AC:2~~, then ~~Robust~~ Management Frame ~~protection~~ Protection shall apply to Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames after the RSNA PTK key establishment is ~~completed~~ completes successfully and after the GTK and IGTK have been delivered. All management frames sent ~~or received~~ by a STA before ~~the~~ keys are installed shall be unprotected. ~~If~~ Management Frame Protection is negotiated, all Action frames received before keys are installed shall be discarded.

If the AKM suite selected in the RSN IE is ~~Suite Type 00-0F-AC:3~~ or ~~00-0F-AC:4~~, then Robust Management Frame ~~protection~~ Protection shall apply to Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames after the ~~Fast BSS Transition~~ FT 4-way handshake or FT protocol has completed, and the GTK and IGTK have been delivered. All management frames sent or received by a STA before the keys are installed shall be unprotected.

8.5 Keys and key distribution

8.5.1 Key hierarchy

Change the first paragraph and its succeeding item list as follows:

RSNA defines ~~two~~ the following key hierarchies:

- a) Pairwise key hierarchy, to protect unicast traffic
- b) GTK, a hierarchy consisting of a single key to protect multicast and broadcast/multicast traffic

NOTE - Pairwise key support with TKIP or CCMP allows a receiving STA to detect MAC address spoofing and data forgery. The RSNA architecture binds the transmit and receive addresses to the pairwise key. If an attacker creates an MPDU with the spoofed TA, then the decapsulation procedure at the receiver will generate an error. GTKs do not have this property.

- c) Integrity GTK (IGTK), a hierarchy consisting of a single key to provide integrity protection for ~~robust~~ broadcast and multicast ~~management~~ Robust Management frames

8.5.1.1 PRF

8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy

Change the description of “The temporal key (TK)” as follows:

- ~~The temporal key (TK) is used for protecting both unicast data and Robust Management Frames. The temporal key (TK) shall be computed as bits 256-283 (for CCMP) or bits 256-511 (for TKIP) of the PTK:~~

$$\text{TK} \leftarrow \text{L}(\text{PTK}, 256, 128) \text{ or}$$

$$\text{TK} \leftarrow \text{L}(\text{PTK}, 256, 256)$$

8.5.1.3 Group key hierarchy

Insert ~~the following two~~ a new ~~subclauses~~ sub clause after 8.5.1.3 as follows:

8.5.1.3a Integrity ~~Group Key~~ group key hierarchy

~~The IGTK shall be initialized with a random value.~~

The Authenticator shall select the IGTK as a random value each time it is generated.

The Authenticator may update the IGTK for reasons such as:

- The ~~Disassociation~~ disassociation or ~~Deauthentication~~ deauthentication of a STA.
- An event within the STA's SME which triggers a Group Key Handshake.

The EAPOL-Key state machines (~~←~~(see 8.5.5 and ~~-~~8.5.6) configure the IGTK via the MLME-SET-KEYS.request primitive.

The IGTK sequence counter is used to provide replay protection.

Note that a STA that has left the group can forge frames as an ~~outsider~~ insider until the IGTK is updated.

8.5.2 EAPOL-Key ~~Frames~~ frames

Insert the following row into Table ~~62-8-4~~ - KDE before the “Reserved” entry and update the numbering appropriately:

Table 8-4—KDE

OUI	Data Type	Meaning
00-0F-AC	TBD <ANA>	IGTK KDE

EDITORIAL NOTE: 802.11w-11-2007 has values assigned up through 8. ~~Values~~ Value assigned above as ~~TBD~~ <ANA> and ~~are~~ is pending ANA request assignments. The Reserved field must be updated as appropriate.

~~Insert the following text and tables after Table 64:~~

Insert the following text and Figure 8-32a before the paragraph starting “The following EAPOL-Key frames are used to implement the three different exchanges:”:

The format of the IGTK KDE is shown in ~~Table 64B~~Figure 8-32a. The IGTK Packet Number (~~PN~~IPN) corresponds to the last PN used by the broadcast/multicast transmitter, to be used by the receiver as the initial value for the BIP replay counter.

Table 64B—IGTK KDE format

KeyID	PN	IGTK
2 octets	6 octets	16 octets

KeyID	IPN	IGTK
2 octets	6 octets	16 octets

Figure 8-32a—IGTK KDE format

8.5.2.1 EAPOL-Key frame notation

~~Change the GTK notation as follows:~~

~~GTK[N_{GTK}]~~ is the GTK, with key identifier field set to N_{GTK}. The key identifier specifies which index should be used for this GTK. Index 0 shall not be used for GTKs, except in mixed environments, as described in 8.5.1.

Insert the following text after before the ~~GTK notation~~notation for “PMKID”:

IGTK[N_{IGTK}M] is the ~~GTK~~IGTK, with key identifier field set to N_{IGTK}M.
~~PN~~IPN is the current IGTK replay counter value provided by the IGTK KDE

8.5.3 4-Way Handshake


8.5.3.3 4-Way Handshake Message 3

Change the entry for "Key Data" in 8.5.3.3 as indicated below:

Key Data = For PTK generation, the AP's Beacon/Probe Response frame's RSN information element, and, optionally, a second RSN information element that is the Authenticator's pairwise cipher suite assignment, and, if a group cipher has been negotiated, the encapsulated GTK and the GTK's key identifier (see 8.5.2), and if ~~Robust-Management Frame protection~~ Protection is enabled, the IGTK KDE. For STK generation Initiator RSN IE, Lifetime of SMK is used.

8.5.3.6 Sample 4-Way Handshake

Replace Figure 151 with the following Figure, with the ~~updated~~ updates including IGTK KDE on the 3rd EAPOL-Key message and "IGTK for Key ID" on the 3rd supplicant box:






Figure 8-33—Sample 4-Way Handshake

Change the text in 8.5.3.6 item 'e' as follows:

- e) The Authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame containing ANonce, the RSN information element from its Beacon or Probe Response messages, MIC, whether to install the temporal keys, ~~and~~ the encapsulated GTK, ~~and if Robust Management Frame protection Protection is enabled, the IGTK.~~

8.5.4 Group Key Handshake

Change the text of the first 3 paragraphs ~~included~~ including the itemized list as follows:

The Authenticator uses the Group Key Handshake to send a new GTK, ~~and~~ ~~and, if Management Frame protection is enabled, a new IGTK~~ to the Supplicant.

The Authenticator may initiate the exchange when a Supplicant is disassociated or deauthenticated.

Message 1: Authenticator → Supplicant: EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,Key RSC,0, MIC, GTK[~~N_{GTK}~~N],IGTK[~~N_{IGTK}~~M])

Message 2: Supplicant ←→ Authenticator: EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,MIC,~~0,0~~,0)

Here, the following assumptions apply:

- Key RSC denotes the last frame sequence number sent using the GTK.
- GTK[~~N_{GTK}~~N] denotes the GTK encapsulated with its key identifier as defined in 8.5.2 using the KEK defined in 8.5.1.2 and associated IV.
- IGTK[~~N_{IGTK}~~M], when present, denotes the IGTK encapsulated with its key identifier as defined in 8.5.2 using the KEK defined in 8.5.1.2 and associated IV.
- The MIC is computed over the body of the EAPOL-Key frame (with the MIC field zeroed for the computation) using the KCK defined in 8.5.1.2.

8.5.4.1 Group Key Handshake Message 1

Change the description for ‘Key Data’ in -8.5.4.1 as follows:

Key Data = encrypted, encapsulated

- GTK and the GTK’s key identifier (see 8.5.2)
- When present, IGTK, IGTK’s key identifier, and ~~sequence number-IPN~~ (see 8.5.2)

Change item ‘c’ in -8.5.4.1 as follows:

- c) Uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the temporal ~~GTK~~GTK and, when present, and-IGTK into its IEEE 802.11 MAC.

8.5.4.3 Group Key Handshake implementation considerations

Change the second paragraph as follows:

The state machines in 8.5.5 and 8.5.6 change the ~~GTK~~GTK and, when present, and-IGTK in use by the network. See Figure 152.

Change the last paragraph and its numbered list as follows:

The following steps occur:

- a) The Authenticator generates a new ~~GTK~~GTK and, when Robust Management frame protection has been negotiated, and-a new IGTK. It encapsulates the ~~GTK~~GTK and as necessary IGTK and sends an EAPOL-Key frame containing the ~~GTK~~GTK and IGTK (Message 1), along with the last sequence number used with the GTK (RSC) and the last sequence number used with the IGTK (~~PN~~IPN).
- b) On receiving the EAPOL-Key frame, the Supplicant validates the MIC, decapsulates the ~~GTK~~GTK and, when present, and-the IGTK and uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the GTK, ~~IGTK~~IGTK, RSC, and ~~PN~~IPN in its STA.
- c) The Supplicant then constructs and sends an EAPOL-Key frame in acknowledgment to the Authenticator.
- d) On receiving the EAPOL-Key frame, the Authenticator validates the MIC. If the GTK, and-and, if present, IGTK ~~is-are~~ not already configured into IEEE 802.11 MAC, after the Authenticator has delivered the GTK, and IGTK to all associated STAs, it uses the MLME-SETKEYS.request primitive to configure the GTK, and IGTK into the IEEE 802.11 STA.

Replace Figure 152-8-34 with the following Figure, with the **updated** updates including IGTK on the first EAPOL-Key message and 2nd supplicant box, **adding "0,0"** on reformatting the first message above the **second EAPOL-Key** message arrow and IGTK and new subscripts to the last Authenticator box:




Figure 8-34—Sample Group Key Handshake

8.5.5 RSNA Supplicant key management state machine

8.5.5.1 Supplicant state machine states

Replace Figure ~~153~~ 8-35 with the following figure updating “Snonce” to “SNonce”, adding “IGTK[0...M] = 0” in the “AUTHENTICATION” box and “MLME-DeleteKeysRequest(IGTK[0...M])” to the “INITIALIZE” box:




Figure 8-35—RSNA Supplicant key management state machine

8.5.5.2 Supplicant state machine variables

Insert the following text immediately following the 'GTK[]' variable:

- IGTK[] - This variable represents the current IGTKs for each management group key index.

8.5.5.3 Supplicant state machine procedures

Change the '~~StaProcessEAPOL~~StaProcessEAPOL-Key' item as follows:

- **StaProcessEAPOL-Key** - The Supplicant invokes this procedure to process a received ~~EAPOLKey~~ **EAPOL-Key** frame. The pseudo-code for this procedure is as follows:

StaProcessEAPOL-Key (S, M, A, I, K, RSC, ANonce, RSC, MIC, RSNIE, ~~GTK[N_{GTK}N]~~,
~~IGTK[N_{IGTK}M]E, PN~~)

TPTK ← PTK

TSNonce ← 0

PRSC ← 0

UpdatePTK ← 0

State ← UNKNOWN

if M = 1 **then**

if Check MIC(*PTK, EAPOL-Key frame*) fails **then**

 State ← FAILED

else

 State ← MICOK

endif

endif

if K = P **then**

if State ~~!=~~ ≠ FAILED **then**

if PSK exists **then** - PSK is a preshared key

 PMK ← PSK

else

 PMK ← L(MSK, 0, 256)

endif

 TSNonce ← SNonce

if ANonce ~~!=~~ ≠ PreANonce **then**

 TPTK ← Calc PTK(PMK, ANonce, TSNonce)

 PreANonce ← ANonce

endif

if State = MICOK **then**

 PTK ← TPTK

 UpdatePTK ← 1

if UpdatePTK = 1 **then**

if no GTK **then**

 PRSC ← RSC

endif

```
    if MLME-SETKEYS.request(0, TRUE, PRSC, PTK) fails then
        invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request
    endif
    MLME.SETPROTECTION.request(TA, Rx)
endif
if GTK then
    if (GTK[NGTKN] ← Decrypt GTK) succeeds then
        if MLME-SETKEYS.request(NGTKN, 0, RSC, GTK[NGTKN]) fails then
            invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request
        endif
    else
        State ← FAILED
    endif
endif
if IGTK then
    if (IGTK[NIGTKM] ← Decrypt IGTK) succeeds then
        if MLME-SETKEYS.request(NIGTKM, 0, PN, IGTK[NIGTKM]) fails then
            invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request
        endif
    else
        State ← FAILED
    endif
endif
endif
else if KeyData = GTK then
    if State = MICOK then
        if (GTK[NGTKN] ← Decrypt GTK) succeeds then
            if MLME-SETKEYS.request(NGTKN, T, RSC, GTK[NGTKM]) fails then
                invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE request
            endif
        else
            State ← FAILED
        endif
        if (IGTK[NIGTKM] ← Decrypt IGTK) succeeds then
            if MLME-SETKEYS.request(NIGTKM, T, PN, IGTK[NIGTKM]) fails then
                invoke MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE request
            endif
        else
            State ← FAILED
        endif
    else
        State ← FAILED
    endif
endif
```

```
endif
endif
if A = 1 && State ≠ Failed then
    MLME-SETPROTECTION.request(0,1,0,0,K,0,0,TSNonce,MIC(TPTK),RSNIE)
endif
if UpdatePTK = 1 then
    MLME-SETPROTECTION.request(TA, Tx_Rx)
endif
if State = MICOK && S = 1 then
    MLME-SETPROTECTION.request(TA, Tx_Rx)
    if IBSS then
        keycount++
        if keycount = 2 then
            802.1X::portValid ← TRUE
        endif
    else
        802.1X::portValid ← TRUE
    endif
endif
endif
```

Change the second paragraph succeeding the pseudocode as follows:


When processing 4-Way Handshake Message 3, the ~~GTK, GTK~~ and IGTK are ~~is~~ decrypted from the EAPOL-Key frame and installed. The PTK shall be installed before the ~~GTK, GTK~~ and IGTK.

Insert the following items at the end of -8.5.5.3:

- **DecryptIGTK(x)** - Decrypt the IGTK from the EAPOL-Key frame.

8.5.6 RSNAuthenticator key management state machines

Replace Figure ~~155-8-37~~ with the following Figure, with the updates being fixing Anonce with ANonce in the PTKSTART, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, and PTKINITNEGOTIATING and the insertion of "IGTK[M]" in the PTKINITNEGOTIATING box:






Figure 8-37—Authenticator state machines, part 1

Replace Figure 8-40 with the following Figure, with the updates being the addition into the GTK_INIT state (semicolons showing linebreaks): “IGTK[0..M] = 0; GN_igtk = 4; GM_igtk = 5; IGTK[GN_igtk] = random key”; addition into SETKEYSDONE state: “MLME-SETKEYS.request(GN_igtk, IGTK, IGTK[GN_igtk]); MLME-SETPROTECTION.request(Rx_Tx_MMPDU, IGTK)”. Addition into SETKEYS state: “Swap(GM_igtk, GN_igtk); IGTK[GN_igtk] = random key”.insertion of “IGTK[M]” in the PTKINITNEGOTIATING box:




Figure 8-40—Authenticator state machines, part 4

8.6 Mapping EAPOL Keys to IEEE 802.11 keys

8.6.3 Mapping PTK to CCMP keys

Change the 2nd paragraph in 8.6.3 as follows:

A STA shall use the temporal key as the CCMP key for MSDUs and MMPDUs or A-MSDUs between the two communicating STAs.

Insert a new sub clause after 8.6.6 as follows:

8.6.6a Mapping IGTK to BIP Keys

See 8.5.1.3a for the definition of the IGTK key. A STA shall use bits 0-127 of the IGTK as the AES-128-CMAC key.

~~8.7 Per-frame pseudo-code~~

8.8 ~~WEP~~ Per-frame pseudo-code

8.8.2 RSNA frame pseudo-code

Change the paragraph as follows:

STAs transmit protected MSDUs or MMPDUs to an RA when temporal keys are configured and an MLME-~~SETPROTECTION.request~~ primitive has been invoked ~~for transmit~~ with ProtectType parameter ~~Tx Tx, Rx Tx, Tx MMPDU~~ or ~~Rx Tx, Rx Tx MMPDU~~ to that RA. STAs expect to receive protected MSDUs or MMPDUs and A-MSDUs from a TA when temporal keys are configured and an MLME-~~SETPROTECTION.request~~ primitive has been invoked ~~for receive~~ with ProtectType parameter ~~Rx Rx, Rx Tx, Tx MMPDU~~ or ~~Rx Tx to Rx Tx MMPDU~~ from that TA. MSDUs and MMPDUs or A-MSDUs that do not match these conditions are sent and are received ~~without~~ in the ~~benefit of encryption~~ clear.

8.8.2.1 Per-MSDU Tx pseudo-code

Insert a new subclause after 8.7.2.1 as follows:

8.8.2.1a Per-MMPDU Tx pseudo-code

```
if (dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) then
    if ((Robust Management Frame Protection bit of RSNA Capability Field is set for
Txdot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE) and (FrameControl.SubType is
one of Disassociation, Deauthentication or Action)) then
        -- Management Frame needs to be protected
        // Management Frame Protection is enabled and frame is eligible for protection
        if (MMPDU has an individual RA) then
            -if ((MMPDU has an individual RA) and (MMPDU Protection for RA is off for Tx))
            then
                // Check for legacy operation
                Transmit the MMPDU without protection, after fragmentation
            else if (MMPDU has individual RA) then
            else if (Pairwise key exists for the MMPDU's RA) then
                // noteNote that it is assumed that no entry will be in the key
                // mapping table will be of a cipher type that is unsupportedan unsupported
                cipher.
                Set the Key ID subfield of the IV field to zero
                Transmit the MMPDU, to be protected after fragmentation
```

```

        endif
        // see 8.7.2.2a
    else
        // pairwise key was not found
        Discard the entire MMPDU and generate an MLME.confirm primitive, if it
        exists, to notify the SME that the MMPDU was undeliverable
    endif
else // MMPDU has a multicast/broadcast RA
    if (IGTK exists) then
        // if we find a suitable IGTK
        Set the Key ID subfield of the MMIE to corresponding IGTK KeyID
        Transmit the MMPDU with BIP
    else
        Discard the entire MMPDU and generate an MLME.confirm primitive, if it
        exists, to notify the SME that the MMPDU was undeliverable
    endif
endif
else
    // Either Management Frame Protection is not supported enabled OR
    // frame is not eligible for protection
    Transmit the MMPDU without protection
endif
endif
```

Insert a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause after 8.7.2.2:

8.8.2.2a Per-MPDU Tx pseudo-code for MMPDU

```

if ((dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) and (Robust Management Frame Protection bit of RSNA Capa-
bility Field is set for Tx)) then
    if (MPDU is member of an MMPDU that is to be transmitted without protection) then
        Transmit the MPDU without protection
    else if (MPDU is individual RA) then
        Protect the MPDU using entry's TK and selected cipher from RSN IE
        Transmit the MPDU
    else
        // MPDU has a multicast/broadcast RA
        Protect the MPDU using IGTK and BIP
        Transmit the MPDU
    endif
endif
```

Insert a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause after 8.7.2.3 :

8.8.2.3a Per-MPDU Rx pseudo-code for an MMPDU

```
if (dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) then
if (dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) thenthen
  if (Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is
zerodot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE) then
    // Received frame has no protection
    if (Protection for TA is off for Rx) then
      // (dot11RSNALegacyManagementFrames
      dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed = TRUE for Rx) and
      // TA does not support Management Frame Protection
      Receive the unencrypted MPDU
      if (Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is set to 1) then
        Discard the frame
      else
        Receive the MPDU
      endif
    else //Management Frame Protection is expected
      if (MPDU has individual RA) then
        if (Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is set to 0) then
          //unprotected frame
          if ((Pairwise key exists) or ((Pairwise key does not exist) and (FrameControl.SubType is Action))) then
            Discard the frame without indication to LLCframe
          if (MPDU has individual RA)
          Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
          else
            if (security association has an AES-CCM key) then
              Increment dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors
            endif // if (Protection for TA is off for Rx)
          else if (Protection for TA is true for Rx) then
            // Received frame has protection and protection is expected
            if ((MPDU has individual RA) and (Pairwise key exists for the MPDU's TA)) then
              endif
            endif
          if (entrysecurity association has an AES-CCM key) then
            if (PN is not sequential) then
              Discard the MPDU as a replay
              Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays
            else
              Decrypt frame using AES-CCM key
              if (the integrity check fails) then
                Discard the frame
                Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
              endif
            endif
          endif
        endif
      endif
    endif
  endif
endif
```

```
        Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
    endifelse
        Make the MPDU available for further processing
    endif
endif
else
    // if (any other cipher exists) then
    //     Process the frame using other cipher
    // else
    //     Discard the frame
    // No other cipher suite is defined in the standard
    // endif
endif
else if ((MPDU has multicast/broadcast RA) and(IGTK exists))then
    if (MMIE is not present) then
        // Unprotected frame
        if (IGTK exists) or ((IGTK does not exist) and (FrameControl.SubType is
        Action)) then
            Discard the frame
            if (security association has an AES-128-CMAC IGTK) then
                Increment dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVError
            endif
        endif
    else if (entrysecurity association has an AES-128-CMAC keyIGTK) then
        if (PN is not sequentialvalid) then
            Discard the MPDU as a replay
            Increment
            dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplaysdot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays
        else
            else // Check integrity of the frame using AES-128-CMAC key
            if (the ICV failsfails) then
                Discard the frame
                Increment dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors
            endif
        endif
        else
            Make the MPDU available for further processing
        endif
        Discard the frame
        // No other cipher suite is defined in the standard
    endif
    else
        // this state should not be reached
    
```

```

        endif // if (Protection for TA is true for Rx any other cipher exists) then
        // Process the frame using other cipher
        // else
// Received frame has protection and protection is not expected
        // Discard the frame
if (MPDU has individual RA)
        Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
else
Increment dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors
        // endif
    endif
    endif // if (MPDU has individual RA) then
    endif // if (Protection for TA is true for Rx) then
else // if (dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled is not
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled = TRUE) then
    if (Protected Frame subfield of the Frame Control field is set) then
        if (MPDU has multicast/broadcast RA) then
            Receive the MPDU and ignore the integrity check
        else
            Discard Receive the frame MPDU
            Increment dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors
        endif
    else
        Receive the unencrypted MPDU
    endif
endif
endif
endif
```

Insert a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause after 8.7.2.4 :

8.8.2.4a Per-MMPDU Rx pseudo-code

```

if (dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) then
    if ((dot11RSNAEnabled = TRUE) and (dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled =
    TRUE)) then
        if (the frameMPDU was not protectedprotected) then
            Receive the MMPDU unprotected
            Make the MMPDU available to higher layers
        else //Have a protected MMPDU
            if ((MMPDU has individual RA) and (security association has an AES-CCM key))
            then
                if (the MPDU has only one MPDU or multiple MPDUs with sequential PNs)
                then
                    Receive the MMPDU protected
                    Make the MMPDU available to higher layers
                endif
            endif
        endif
    endif
endif
```

```
        else
            Discard the MMPDU as a replay
            Increment dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays
        endif
    else if ((MMPDU-MPDU has individual-broadcast/multicast RA) and (the Pairwise
    key is security association has an AES-CCM key)) or (MMPDU has multicast/broad-
    east-RA 128-CMAC IGTK)) then
        Receive the MMPDU-protected-MMPDU
        Make the MMPDU available to higher layers
    else
        // if (any other cipher exists) then
        // Process the frame using other cipher
        // else
        // Discard the frame
        // endif
    endif
endif
endif
endif
```

9. MAC Sublayer functional description

10. Layer Management

10.3 MLME SAP interface

10.3.17 SetKeys

10.3.17.1 MLME-SETKEYS.request

10.3.17.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive

Change the "*KeyID*" and *Key Type*' ~~entry~~-entries in the *SetKeyDescriptor* of Clause 10.3.17.1.2 as follows:

Name	Type	Valid range	Description
Key Type	Integer	Group, Pairwise, Peer-key, <u>IGTK</u>	Defines whether this key is a group key, pairwise key, or PeerKey , or the <u>Integrity Group key</u> .

Name	Type	Valid range	Description
Key ID	Integer	0-3 (or 4-4095 for <u>IGTK</u>)	Key identifier
Key Type	Integer	Group, Pairwise, Peer-key, <u>IGTK</u>	Defines whether this key is a group key, pairwise key, or PeerKey , or <u>Integrity Group key</u> .

10.3.18.1 MLME-DELETEKEYS.request

10.3.18.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive

Change the 'Protect Type' and 'Key Type' entries in the SetKeyDescriptor of Clause 10.3.18.1.2 as follows:

Name	Type	Valid range	Description
Key Type	Integer	Group, Pairwise, Peer-key, <u>IGTK</u>	Defines whether this key is a group key, pairwise key, or PeerKey , or the <u>Integrity Group key</u> .

10.3.22.1 MLME-SETPROTECTION.request

10.3.22.1.2 Semantics of the service primitive

Change the ~~'Key Type' entry in the ProtectList~~ of Clause 10.3.22.1.2 as follows:

Name	Type	Valid range	Description
Protect Type	Enumeration	None, Rx, Tx, Rx_Tx_, <u>Rx MMPDU</u> , <u>Tx MMPDU</u> , <u>Rx Tx MMPDU</u>	The protection value for this MAC.
Key Type	Integer	Group, Pairwise, Peer-key, <u>IGTK</u>	Defines whether this key is a group key, pairwise key, or PeerKey or the <u>Integrity Group key</u> .

11. MLME

EDITORIAL NOTE: TGN has added sections up through 11.4718, TGw succeeds with 11.4819.

Insert at the end of Clause 11 a new ~~subclause~~ sub clause as follows:

11.19 Broadcast and multicast Robust Management ~~Frame~~ frame procedures

When ~~Robust~~ Management Frame ~~protection~~ Protection is enabled, the MLME shall provide an encapsulation service for broadcast/multicast Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames. All broadcast/multicast Robust Management ~~Frames~~ frames shall be submitted to this service for encapsulation and transmission.

The broadcast/multicast frame protection service shall take the following actions:

- ~~Robust~~ Management ~~frame~~ ~~protection~~ Frame Protection for multicast/broadcast shall be set using the MLME-SETPROTECTION.request with the Protectlist including a Key Type value of IGTK. ~~-A~~ non-AP STA shall also set the Protect Type value to Rx_MMPDU. ~~In an IBSS, STAs shall set the ProtectType value to Rx_Tx_MMPDU.~~ An AP shall set the Protect Type value to Tx_MMPDU.
- The IGTK shall be installed using the MLME-SETKEYS.request with the value IGTK for the Key Type field in the Key Descriptor element.
- All ~~Robust~~ broadcast/multicast ~~action mRobust~~ Robust Management ~~frames, the broadcast/multicast management frame~~ frames shall be encapsulated and protected using BIP (see 8.3.4).

11A. Fast BSS Transition

EDITORIAL NOTE: This clause is introduced by TGr and is tracked by TGw.

11A.2 Key holders

11A.2.2 Authenticator key holders

Change the 2nd dashed item in the 7th paragraph of 11A.2.2 as follows:

- The R1KH shall provide the IEEE 802.11 Authenticator function to derive and distribute the GTK and IGTK to all connected STAs.

11A.4 Fast BSS Transition Initial Mobility Domain Association

11A.4.2 Fast BSS Transition initial mobility domain association in an RSN

Change the 3rd message of the 12th paragraph in 11A.4.2 as follows:

R1KH → [#688] S1KH: Data(EAPOL-Key(1, 1, 1, 1, P, 0, ANonce, MIC, RSNIE[PMKR1Name], MDIE, GTK[N], IGTK[M], FTIE, TIE[ReassociationDeadline], TIE[KeyLifetime]))

11A.6 Fast BSS Transition resource request protocol

11A.6.2 Over-the-air fast BSS transition with resource request

Change the 12th paragraph in 11A.6.2 as follows:

In an RSN, on successful completion of the FT Authentication exchange of the FT resource request protocol, the PTKSA has been established and proven live. The Key Replay Counter shall be initialized to zero and

the subsequent EAPOL-key frames (e.g., GTK and IGTK updates) shall use the Key Replay Counter to ensure they are not replayed. The PTKSA shall be deleted by the Target AP if it does not receive a reassociation request from the STA within the reassociation deadline timeout value.

11A.6.3 Over-the-DS fast BSS transition with resource request

Change the 10th paragraph in 11A.6.3 as follows:

In an RSN, on successful completion of the FT Confirm/Acknowledgement frame exchange, the PTKSA has been established and proven live. The Key Replay Counter shall be initialized to zero and the subsequent EAPOL-key frames (e.g., GTK and IGTK updates) shall use the Key Replay Counter to ensure they are not replayed. The PTKSA shall be deleted by the Target AP if it does not receive a reassociation request from the STA within the reassociation deadline timeout value. Resource request procedures are specified in 11A.11.

11A.7 Fast BSS transition reassociation

11A.7.1 Fast BSS transition reassociation in an RSN

Change the 2nd message of the 2nd paragraph in 11A.7.1 as follows:

Target AP →[#688] STA: Reassociation Response(RSNIE[PMKR1Name], MDIE, FTIE[MIC, ANonce, SNonce, R1KH-ID, R0KH-ID], GTK[N], IGTK[M], RIC-Response)

11A.8 Fast BSS transition authentication sequence

11A.8.5 FT authentication sequence: contents of fourth message

Change the 3rd dashed item of the 4th paragraph in 11A.8.5 as follows:

- When this message of the authentication sequence appears in a Reassociation Response frame, the optional parameters in the FTIE may include a the GTK and IGTK sub-elements. If a GTK or an IGTK ~~are is~~-included, the Key field of the sub-element shall be encrypted using KEK and the NIST AES Key Wrap algorithm. The Key field shall be padded before encrypting if the key length is less than 16 octets or if it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending a single octet 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets. When processing a received message, the receiver shall ignore this trailing padding. Addition of padding does not change the value of the Key Length field. Note: The length of the encrypted Key field can be determined from the length of the GTK or IGTK sub-element.

11A.9 Fast BSS Transition security architecture state machines

Replace Figure 11A-13 with the following Figure, with the updates being including “IGTK[M]” in the FT-PTK-CALC-NEGOTIATING3 box:




Figure 11A-13—Authenticator R1KH state machine (part 1)

Replace Figure 11A-14 with the following Figure, with the updates being including “IGTK” in the FT-HANDSHAKE-DONE box:




Figure 11A-14—Authenticator R1KH state machine (part 2)

Annex A

(normative)

~~A.1 Introduction~~

~~A.2 Abbreviations and special symbols~~

~~A.3 Instructions for completing the PICS proforma~~

Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS)

A.4 PICS proforma — IEEE Std 802.11, ~~2006 Edition~~ 2007

~~A.4.1 Implementation identification~~

~~A.4.2 Protocol summary~~

~~A.4.3 IUT configuration~~

A.4.4 MAC protocol

A.4.4.1 MAC protocol capabilities

Change row entry “PC34” of the table in A.4.4.1 as follows:

PC34	Robust security network association (RSNA)	7.2.2, 7.3.1.4, 5.4.3.3, <u>8.7.2.1, 8.7.2.2,</u> <u>8.7.2.3, 8.7.2.4,</u> 11.3.1, 11.3.2, 8.3.3	O	Yes No
------	--	--	---	--------

Insert the following row to end of table in A.4.4.1 as a subset of the RSN :

PCX 34.1.10	Protection Management Frame	7.3.1.11, 7.4.2, 7.1.3.1.9, 7.3.2.25.3, 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2, 8.3.2.2, 8.3.2.3.4, 8.3.3.3.2, 8.3.3.3.5, 8.3.3.4.1, 8.3.3.4.3, 8.4.3	PCX34.1:O	Yes No
-------------	-----------------------------	---	-----------	--------

PC 34.1.10	Management Frame Protection	7.3.1.11, 7.4.2, 7.1.3.1.9, 7.3.2.25.3, 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2, 8.3.2.2, 8.3.2.3.4, 8.3.3.3.2, 8.3.3.3.5, 8.3.3.4.1, 8.3.3.4.3, 8.4.3, 8.7.2.1A, 8.7.2.3A, 8.7.2.4A	PC34.1:O	Yes No
PC 34.1.10.1	BIP	8.3.4, 11.18	PC34.1.10:M	Yes No
PC 34.1.10.1.1	Management MIC IE	7.3.2.53	PC34.1.10.1:M	Yes No

EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry value is shown as PCX 34.1.10 but its final value is pending ANA assignment

Annex D

(normative)

ASN.1 encoding of the MAC and PHY MIB

~~Insert the following at the end of the Dot11StationConfigEntry in Annex D:~~

Change the Dot11StationConfigEntry in Annex D by inserting a comma and the new entries at the end of the existing entries (represented below by "...") as:

```
dot11StationConfigEntry ::=
    SEQUENCE {
        ...
        dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled TruthValue,
dot11RSNABcastProtectedManagementFramesEnableddot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed TruthValue
    }
```

Insert the following after the ~~dot11RSNAStats~~dot11RSNAStats TABLE entries in Annex D:

EDITORIAL NOTE: TGN uses up to value 63

```
--*****
--* Robust Management Frame protectionProtection MIBs
--*****
```

```
dot11RSNAProtectedManagementFramesEnabled      OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX TruthValue
    MAX-ACCESS read-write
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
        "This variable indicates whether or not this STA
        Protects unicast Management Frames."
    DEFAULT { TRUE }
    ::= { dot11StationConfigEntry TBD64 }
```

~~EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry value is left as TBD for now, pending ANA assignment~~

```
dot11RSNABcastProtectedManagementFramesEnabled
dot11RSNAUnprotectedManagementFramesAllowed    OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX TruthValue
    MAX-ACCESS read-write
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
"This variable indicates whether or not this STA
protects broadcast/multicast management Frames."
    "This variable indicates whether or not this STA supports
robust RSNA STAs which do not provide Robust Management
```

```
frames protection."  
    DEFAULT { TRUE FALSE }  
    ::= { dot11StationConfigEntry TBD 65 }
```

EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry value is left as TBD for now, pending ANA assignment

Insert at the end of the dot11RSNAStatsEntry Sequence the following:

EDITORIAL NOTE: IEEE 802.11-2007 uses values up to 10

```
dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors          Counter32,  
dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays            Counter32,  
dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays  Counter32,  
dot11RSNAStatsLegacyManagementFrames dot11RSNABIPMICErrors  OBJECT-  
TYPECounter32
```

~~SYNTAX TruthValue~~

~~MAX-ACCESS read-write~~

~~STATUS current~~

~~DESCRIPTION~~

~~"This variable indicates whether or not this STA supports robust RSNA non-AP STAs which do not provide Robust Management Frames protection."~~

~~DEFAULT { FALSE }~~

~~::= { dot11StationConfigEntry TBD }~~

EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry value is left as TBD for now, pending ANA assignment

```
dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors          OBJECT-TYPE
```

SYNTAX Counter32

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The number of received MPDUs discarded by the CMAC integrity ~~checking~~ ~~check~~ algorithm."

::= { dot11RSNAStatsEntry 11 }

```
dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays            OBJECT-TYPE
```

SYNTAX Counter32

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The number of received MPDUs discarded by the CMAC replay errors."

::= { dot11RSNAStatsEntry 12 }

```
dot11RSNAStatsBIPReplays dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays OBJECT-TYPE
```

~~SYNTAX Counter32~~

~~MAX-ACCESS ACCESS~~ read-only

~~STATUS~~ current
~~DESCRIPTION:~~
DESCRIPTION:
"The number of received ~~BIP frames~~MMPDUs discarded due to
~~duplicate or old sequence numbers~~CCMP replay errors"
 ::= {dot11RSNAStatsEntry 13}

~~dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays~~~~dot11RSNABIPMICErrors~~ OBJECT-TYPE

~~SYNTAX~~ Counter32
~~MAX-ACCESS~~ ACCESS read-only
~~STATUS~~ current

~~DESCRIPTION:~~
DESCRIPTION:
"The number of received ~~Robust Management CCMP frames~~MMPDUs
discarded due to ~~duplicate or old sequence numbers~~BIP MIC
errors"
 ::= {dot11RSNAStatsEntry 14}

--*****
--* End of Robust Management Frame MIB
--*****

~~Insert at the end of the dot11RSNAStatsEntry Sequence the following:~~

~~dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors~~ Counter32,
~~dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays~~ Counter32,
~~dot11RSNAStatsBIPReplays~~ Counter32,
~~dot11RSNAStatsRobustMgmtCCMPReplays~~ Counter32

Annex H

(informative)

Insert the following at the end of Annex H a subclause H.8, with the following text:

H.8 Test vectors for AES-128-CMAC

“Test vectors for AES-128-CMAC may be found in Annex D.1 of NIST SP-800-38B”

~~EDITORIAL NOTE: The entry value is left as TBD for now, pending ANA assignment~~

